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We  develop  rules  for  pricing  and  capacity  choice  for  an  interruptible  service  that  recognise  the 
interdependence between consumers' perceptions of system reliability and their market behaviour. Consumers 
post ex ante demands, based on their expectations on aggregate demand. Posted demands are met if ex post 
supply  capacity  is  sufficient.  However,  if  supply  is  inadequate  all  ex  ante  demands  are  proportionally 
interrupted.  Consumers'  expectations  of  aggregate  demand  are  assumed  to  be  rational.  Under  reasonable 
values for the consumer's degrees of relative risk aversion and prudence, demand is decreasing in supply 
reliability. We derive operational expressions for the optimal pricing rule and the capacity expansion rule. We 
show that the optimal price under uncertainty consists of the optimal price under certainty plus a markup that 
positively depends on the degrees of relative risk aversion, relative prudence and system reliability. We also 
show that any reliability enhancing investment - though lowering the operating surplus of the public utility - 
is socially desirable as long as it covers the cost of investment. 
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1.1 Motivation
The San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) provides water to
the citizens of San Francisco and￿ under contractual agreement with 29 whole-
sale water agencies￿ to 1.6 million additional customers within three Bay Area
counties. Overall, 2.4 million people receive 260 million gallons (over 1 bil-
lion liter) of water per day. Most of the water is imported from the Sierra
Nevada, delivered through the Hetch Hetchy aquaducts. The most serious
threat to the water supply of the Bay Area is a drought, through its impact
on the Sierra Mountains￿snowpack which feeds the Hetch Hetchy water sup-
ply system. How should the SFPUC, or any other public utility providing
a service with uncertain capacity, set its price? And how should it evaluate
the desirability of its infrastructure investments? Our advice is: (i) calcu-
late the price according to a standard inverse elasticity rule, corrected for
the marginal cost of public funds (eq (4.8)) and add to it a mark-up that
depends positively on the degrees of relative risk aversion and prudence, and
negatively on the degree of system reliability (eq (4.9)); and (ii) expand ca-
pacity if the ensuing total reliability improvement, when multiplied with the
degree of relative risk aversion and the marginal cost of production, exceeds
the cost of investment (eq (4.14)).
In general, the supply of services by certain public utilities￿ electricity,
gas, water￿ is characterized by an inherent uncertainty: power generating
capacities are subject to temporary failures, the variability of surface water
levels are not entirely predictable, and likewise for the in￿ ow to water and
gas reservoirs.1 In addition, the quality of the delivered service may not be
fully controllable (risk of pollution). Insulating consumers of these services
for any supply risk, that is, guaranteeing a 100% service reliability, would in
most cases require investments in infrastructure that are prohibitively costly.
The ￿rst best solution is a set of contingency contracts￿ clear agreements
for the delivery of units of service under well de￿ned contingencies, which
are paid in advance. By buying rights to such contingency deliveries, a
consumer can￿ should he wish￿ secure himself a certain delivery in the future.
Although new markets have been developed in recent years to insure against
variations in temperature, precipitation, and events like drought, fall freeze,
etc., such markets remain often closed to the general public. An alternative
is the let consumers face spot prices that balance demand and supply at any
1 Similarly, demand for these services displays a variability that may only be described
statistically. Often, factors that cause a drop in supply capacity, such as a drought, will
also cause demand to rise. In this paper, we abstract from any demand variability.
3time. There are two problems with such an arrangement. First, it may be
very costly to inform consumers in real time about the governing price level.
Second, it may impose on consumers a considerable price risk. The price
elasticity for residential water demand in the Bay Area is ￿:176 (SFPUC,
2007: 21). A 10% supply reduction would require prices to rise by 57%.2
For the Gironde area in France, Nauges and Reynaud (2001) estimate the
short run demand elasticity for domestic water use at ￿:08. With such an
inelastic demand, a 10% supply reduction would require a price increase of
125%!3 Politicians are reluctant to allow the service price of public utilities
swing that much. Irrespective of whether price stability is an objective or a
constraint, the balancing of a variable supply with demand calls for quantity
rationing.
In this paper, we are interested in the optimal policies for pricing and
capacity choice of an uncertain supply under two conditions: (i) that prices
are be kept stable, and (ii) that in the event of excess demand, the service is
rationed in proportion to notional demands￿ the demands that would ensue
at the (stable) price. First, proportional rationing is frequently practiced.
In the case of the Bay Area water supply, the master contract between the
SFPUC and its wholesale customers explicitly stipulates a proportional ra-
tioning rule (SFPUC, 2007: 17). But even when a proportional rationing
rule is not literally practised, it is not uncommon that ￿ good￿or ￿ loyal￿cus-
tomers are being prioritized by the service supplier in case of excess demand.
The rationing rule is then said to be manipulable (in the sense of Benassy,
1977: 152) because customers can in￿ uence their share of the scarce supply
by signalling a larger demand. A proportional rationing rule is the prime
example of a manipulable allocation rule, and its study is useful to get insight
in other situations where customers can exert in￿ uence on the amounts of
the service ￿nally allocated to them. Though our focus on a proportional
rationing rule is motivated on these positive grounds, we note that there exist
normative reasons for such a rule (see Moulin, 2000).
1.2 Relation to the literature
Our paper is closely related to the literature on peak-load pricing under
demand and supply uncertainty. The main presumption of this literature is
2Ignoring scale e⁄ects on the willingness to pay.
3 Using a data set covering 1142 large industrial and commercial customers in Northern
California, Borenstein (2007) calculated customer bills under time-invariant, time-of-use,
and real-time pricing (RTP) schemes and found that, after adjusting for seasonal variation,
the coe¢ cient of variation of a customer￿ s bill is on average nearly ￿ve time larger under
RTP than under the time-of-use structure that they typically face.
4that both spot pricing and contingency contracts are allocation mechanisms
that are too costly to implement and therefore that recourse has to be taken
to other rationing mechanisms to bring demand in line with available supply.
For example, Brown and Johnson (1969), Turvey (1970), Visscher (1973),
Meyer (1975), Carlton (1977); and Crew and Kleindorfer (1978) have focused
on demand uncertainty while Chao (1983), Fakhraei, Narayanan, Hughes
(1984), Coate and Panzar (1989), and Kleindorfer and Fernando (1993) have
extended the analysis to include supply uncertainty. Typical for this part
of the literature is that rationing takes place on the basis of characteristics
that the are assumed to be observable to the provider, such as outage costs
and/or willingness to pay. Parallel to it, a literature has developed where
rationing takes place on the basis of unobservable but revealed characteristics
of consumers. Examples are self rationing (Panzar and Sibley, 1978, Woo,
1990, Doucet and Roland, 1993) and priority servicing (Marchand, 1974,
Chao and Wilson, 1987, and Wilson, 1989a,b). For a detailed survey of both
strands of literature, see Crew, Fernando and Kleindorfer (1995).4
In this literature, there are very few papers that explicitly model how
consumers formulate their demand based on the perceived reliability of that
service. One exception is the paper by Coate and Panzar (1989) on random
service rationing.5 Inspired by Rees (1980), they let risk neutral ￿rms decide
on their capital equipment before knowing whether electricity will be avail-
able for production. In doing so, ￿rms assign a probability to being blacked
out (the complement of the expected system reliability). Once capital is in-
stalled, demand for electricity follows from short run pro￿t maximization. Ex
post, if actual electricity supply falls short of aggregate demand, a fraction of
￿rms is blacked out in a random way. The model is then closed by requiring
that the mathematical expectation of the actual black out probability equals
the anticipated black out probability (rational expectations). The authors
show that electricity demand positively depends on service reliability and
characterise the optimal pricing and capacity choice for the public utility.
4The literature often focusses on consumers and producers. A recent literature dis-
cusses the role of interruptible service contracts on deregulated power markets as instru-
ments for hedging the wholesale market exposure of retail suppliers to a volatile spot price;
see Gerda and Varaiya (1993), Kamat and Oren (2002), Baldick et al. (2006), and Rocha
and Siddiqui (2008).
5In his model on public utility pricing with uncertain demand, Tschirhart (1980) adds
system reliability as an explanatory variable to the mean demand equation, and assumes
that higher reliability leads to higher mean demand. He does not derive the demand
schedule on the basis of perceived reliability.
51.3 The role of the degree of relative prudence
In the present paper, we study the optimal pricing and capacity choice by
a public utility when inadequate supply is allocated across risk averse con-
sumers according to a proportional rationing rule. Consumers post ex ante
demands for a designated consumption period. These demands will be met
if ex post supply capacity is su¢ cient. If not, all ex ante demands will be
proportionally interrupted. The anticipated system reliability is determined
by anticipated aggregate demand. As Coate and Panzar, we assume rational
expectations: anticipated demand coincides with aggregate ex ante demand.
Unlike with random rationing, however, the proportional rationing rule is
manipulable in that a single consumer may in￿ uence his personal service re-
liability by over/understating his demand. When risk-averse consumers can
in￿ uence their own service reliability, how they respond to system reliability
is an important factor in de￿ning optimal price and capacity levels. In this
respect, the concept of precautionary behaviour plays a crucial role. Such
behaviour follows from a positive third derivative of the consumer￿ s concave
utility function, a property coined prudence by Kimball (1990).
The original discussion of precautionary behaviour is in terms of a con-
sumer￿ s savings decision when facing increased uncertainty with respect to
future labour income or the return to savings￿ see Leland (1968), Sandmo
(1970) and Kimball (1990). This discussion was recently closed by Eeck-
houdt and Schlesinger (2008). In particular, they show that whenever rel-
ative risk aversion exceeds 1, consumers will save more when the rate of
return distribution undergoes a ￿rst degree stochastically dominating shift
(i.e., lower rates of return become more likely); and that whenever relative
prudence exceeds 2, consumers will save more when the rate of return dis-
tribution undergoes a 2nd degree increase in risk (a.k.a. a mean preserving
spread).
We show that these conditions on relative risk aversion and relative pru-
dence will also govern the consumer￿ s responses to increased uncertainty in
our model. Su¢ ciently risk averse and prudent consumers will react to
increased uncertainty by expanding ex ante demand. In fact, whenever
the perceived reliability of the system goes down, ex ante demand goes up￿
exactly the opposite reaction as in Coate and Panzar￿ s (1989) model. This
result underscores the interdependence of system reliability, rationing rule
and demand behaviour. We show that the optimal price is one that inter-
nalises the external e⁄ect of individual demands on system reliability. We
also show that although infrastructure investments which increase the relia-
bility of supply will reduce producer operating surplus, they typical produce
6a more than compensating increase in consumer surplus, a result￿ we believe￿
that calls for regulation of infrastructure decisions.
2 The model
A public utility is the sole supplier of a good or service. The cost of pro-
duction and delivery is a constant c per unit. There is a continuum of con-
sumers with mass normalised to 1 that all have a quasi-linear utility function
over the consumption of the service, w, and a numØraire commodity, Y :
U(w;Y ) = u(w) + Y , where it is assumed that u0 > 0, u00 < 0, u000 > 0
and limw!0 u0(w) = +1. For future reference, we de￿ne the coe¢ cients








Two remarks are in place. First, note that with constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA), Pr ￿ Rr + 1.6 Second, the above utility function implies
that the price elasticity for the w-good equals 1
Rr(w). Table 1 displays typical
estimates for short run demand elasticities for gas, electricity and water. The
low estimates imply values for Rr well exceeding 2. This is useful to keep in
mind when evaluating the results later on in the paper.
Table 1. Demand elasticity estimates for selected utilities.
residential commercial industrial
electricitya :16 :28 :39
natural gasa :15 :28 :26
water :08b :29c
a Lin et al. (1987, p 250): United States
b Nauges and Reynaud (2001, p 181): Gironde (France)
c Reynaud (2003, p 227) Gironde (France)
Each consumer has an exogenous income at his disposal. In our model,
consumers may be heterogeneous in terms of income as long as everybody￿ s
income is high enough. To simplify notation, however, we assume that
incomes are identical and equal to m. If p denotes the price per unit,
the representative consumer has Y = m ￿ pw left for consumption of the
numØraire.
6Pivotal values for Rr and Pr are 1 and 2, respectively. Eeckhoudt et al. (2009) show
how using simple gambles one can elicit whether or not a respondent￿ s degree of relative
risk aversion and prudence exceeds these pivotal values.
7Total supply is represented by a random variable T with a commonly
known cumulative distribution function F (T). The realisation of this vari-
able is exogenous to the consumer. Supply is thus uncertain and the extent
to which aggregate demand Xa exceeds realised supply is the level of supply
inadequacy or excess demand.
The consumer￿ s perception of supply being adequate is given by Pr(T > Xe) =
1￿F (Xe), where Xe is the consumer￿ s expectation regarding the aggregate
demand. The assumed rationality of this expectation requires that Xe = Xa.
It is commonly known that a positive level of excess demand will result
in consumption being interrupted or rationed o⁄. In general, the realised
consumption of the service by person i, wi, may be written as a function of
the ex ante demands by all agents, (xi;x￿i), as well as the available capacity
T, wi = fi(xi;x￿i;T). We assume that the rationing functions fi(￿) follow
what is called a proportional rationing rule, i.e.,





The scheme thus unfolds as follows. (1) The utility announces the price
p in advance of the period. (2) Consumers choose their ex ante demand
x. (3a) If the realised supply is adequate, then x will default as uninter-
rupted consumption. (3b) If the realised supply is inadequate, consumption
is curtailed to T
Xax. (4) Consumers pay for the delivered portion of x at the
announced price p, and consumption takes place.
3 Consumer behaviour
The ￿rst question we answer is how the consumer behaves in choosing his
ex ante demand and to what extent this demand would be in￿ uenced by the
prospect of him being interrupted.

















+[u(x) + m ￿ px][1 ￿ F (X
e)]: (3.1)
If a situation with inadequate supply is expected with some positive prob-
ability, then Pr(T ￿ Xe) < 1 and F (Xe) > 0. The demand ^ x that solves
8problem (3.1) must satisfy the necessary condition:
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XedF (T) = p ￿ rF(X
e); (3.2)
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e
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+ [1 ￿ F (X
e)]; (3.3)




Xe j T ￿ Xe￿
of total demand is expected to be satis￿ed, while with
probability 1￿F(Xe) no shortage occurs and demand is entirely met. Useful
properties of rF(￿) are:
rF(X
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e) = 1: (3.4c)
Applying integration by parts on the left-hand side of (3.2) then allows
us to rewrite this ￿rst-order condition as (see appendix):
u














Xe F (T)dT = p ￿ rF(X
e): (3.5)
We now compare this ￿rst order condition with the case where supply is
expected to be adequate in the sense that F(T) = 0 for all T ￿ Xe. Then
rF(Xe) = 1, and the optimal order x￿ must satisfy
u
0 (x
￿) = p: (3.6)
Comparing (3.5) with (3.6), shows that there are two reasons for ordering
more under inadequate supply. First, the expected price p￿rF(Xe) lies below
the nominal price p. Second, the left-hand side of (3.5) contains a term that
is not present in (3.6). We call this term the marginal risk premium e⁄ect.
It accommodates for the utility consequences of a marginal ordered unit in
those states of the world where supply is insu¢ cient. Because the consumer
faces a multiplicative rather than additive risk, risk aversion alone is not
su¢ cient for a positive risk premium. Only if relative risk aversion exceeds
unity will a marginal order provide a hedge against the consumption risk.
This is the second reason for posting a higher demand than under certainty.
We write demand as ^ x = ^ x(p;Xe;F(￿)).
9Proposition 1 If inadequate supply is expected with some positive probabil-
ity, and Rr > 1, the consumer will post a larger ex ante demand than when
supply is deemed adequate.
The second-order condition may be written as (see appendix):











e Rr(e Pr ￿ 2)F(T)dT
￿
< 0; (3.7)
where ab above an expression means evaluation at b x, while ae means eval-
uation at b xT
Xe. A su¢ ciently high relative prudence thus ensures that the
second-order condition is veri￿ed.
3.1 Comparative statics at the individual level
In this section, we investigate how the consumer who expects interruptions
adjusts his ex ante order because of marginal changes in p, and Xe as well
as marginal changes in the uncertainty surrounding the supply capacity.
Simple comparative statics on (3.5) show that:
@^ x
@p
(￿SOC^ x) = ￿rF(X
e) < 0: (3.8)
It is easy to show that with CRRA preferences, the price elasticity is ￿ 1
Rr.




= ￿b x rF(X
e) < 0: (3.9)
Proposition 2 The consumer￿ s ex-ante demand is decreasing in the price p
while a marginal price increase reduces expected utility with the reliable part
of the posted demand.
How will the consumer￿ s demand respond to a small change in the ex-































The last term on the right-hand side captures the e⁄ect on the marginal
expected outlay of an order. Since an increase in expected demand reduces
10the reliability rate (cf (3.4b)), so does the marginal expected outlay, and this
encourages a higher ex ante order. The ￿rst two terms in curly brackets
account for the e⁄ect on the marginal risk premium. Two sets of su¢ cient
conditions are identi￿able for this e⁄ect to be positive. The ￿rst is that
relative risk aversion is larger than 1 but falling (the latter being equivalent
to 1 + Rr < Pr). The second is revealed by noting that the term in square
brackets may be rewritten as 1 +
￿
e Pr ￿ 3
￿
e Rr (see appendix). Therefore,
a relative prudence larger than 3 and a relative risk aversion exceeding 1
again ensure that @^ x
@Xe > 0. With the range for Rr mentioned earlier, and
Pr ’ Rr + 1, these conditions will be veri￿ed.






0(b x) ￿ p](1 ￿ F(X
e): (3.11)
Since u0(x￿) = p, this e⁄ect is negative under the same conditions that give
b x > x￿. This suggests that there is a negative demand externality: higher
expectations about aggregate demand boost individual demand and reduce
individual welfare. This externality will play an important role in the optimal
pricing rule to be derived in Section 4.
Proposition 3 When either Rr exceeds 1 but is falling, or when Pr and Rr
exceed 3 and 1, respectively, the consumer￿ s ex-ante demand is increasing
in the expected aggregate demand Xe. The e⁄ect of a marginal increase in
the expected aggregate demand on the consumer￿ s maximal expected utility is
negative under the same conditions that give b x > x￿.
Finally, we examine the e⁄ect of marginal changes in the supply distri-
bution. For this purpose, we rede￿ne F(￿) as a weighted average of two
probability distributions, G(￿) and H(￿): F (T;￿)
def = (1 ￿ ￿)G(T) + ￿H (T).
If G ￿rst degree stochastically dominates H, then d￿ > 0 can be thought of
as a FSD-deteriorating shift and the condition is that
F￿ (T;￿) = H(T) ￿ G(T) ￿ 0;8 T 2 [0;1): (3.12)






[H(T) ￿ G(T)]dT ￿ 0; for all z 2 [0;1); (3.13)
11then G second order stochastically dominates H, and d￿ > 0 can be thought
of as a SSD-deteriorating shift.7











Thus both a ￿rst and second order dominance deteriorating shift reduce the
reliability of the system.
The important observation is that the consumer￿ s net marginal utility
behaves asymmetrically around T = Xe where it displays a kink.8 This is
intuitive, as in situations with T > Xe, no interruption occurs, and the net
marginal utility is independent of the degree of excess capacity. However,
with T < Xe, the degree of capacity shortage will a⁄ect the net marginal
utility of the ex ante order. This is presented in Figure 1, where it is





Xe ￿ p T
Xe is falling in T. For this to happen, it is
su¢ cient that Rr( T
Xe ^ x) exceeds 1 for all T. The net marginal utility function
is now non-increasing in T, and its expected value will increase due to an
FSD-deteriorating shift.9
For T < Xe, convexity of the net marginal utility is equivalent to
Pr( T
Xe ^ x) ￿ 2. Since the maximum of two convex functions is convex, the
expected value of the net marginal utility function will increase due to an
SSD-deteriorating shift.10
Formally, we may di⁄erentiate (3.5) completely to obtain:
@^ x
@￿
(￿SOC^ x) = ￿p
@rF(Xe)
















The marginal outlay e⁄ect is clearly negative. To see the e⁄ect of an FSD-
deteriorating shift, it follows immediately from (3.15) that a relative risk
7If in addition G and H have the same mean (i.e.,
R 1
0 F￿ (T;￿)dT = R 1
0 [H(T) ￿ G(T)]dT = 0), then d￿ > 0 may be considered as a mean-preserving spread
(cf. Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970), also called a 2nd degree increase in risk.
8The consequences kinks in the payo⁄ function for the e⁄ects of SSD-shifts on optimal
decisons were ￿rst discussed by Kanbur (1982).
9It can also be shown that Rr( T
Xe b x) > 1 is a necessary condition for the expected
marginal utility to increase for any arbitrary FSD-deteriorating shift.
10It can also be shown that Rr( T
Xe b x) > 1 and Pr( T
Xe b x) > 2 together are a necessary set of
conditions for the expected marginal utility to increase for any arbitrary SSD-deteriorating
shift.
12Figure 1: Net marginal utility as a function of available supply
aversion exceeding 1 is su¢ cient to give rise to a higher ex ante order. In-

















Thus a relative risk aversion exceeding 1 and relative prudence exceeding
2 are jointly su¢ cient conditions for the marginal risk premium e⁄ect to
be positive for any shift in distribution that lowers reliability at all levels.
Graphically, these conditions ensure that the function drawn in Figure 1 is
convex and therefore that its expected value will raise above due to such
shifts. The optimal response is to bring this expected value down to zero
again by increasing the ex ante order.11
11The condition on relative prudence is reminiscent of the analysis of precautionary
savings behaviour: if the rate of return to savings becomes more risky, the consumer will
increase the amount saved if and only if his relative prudence exceeds 2 (this result dates
back to Leland (1968); a modern account is found in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger, 2008).
Prudence needs to be high enough to place a higher order because on the one hand a more
risky distribution makes the uncertain consumption of the service or good less attractive
compared with the certain consumption of the numØraire (the substitution e⁄ect), but on
the other hand, the increase in risk makes the consumer more cautious (the precautionary
motive e⁄ect).
Here, we need in addition a condition on relative risk aversion. Graphically, this is easy
to understand. If
p
b u0 + b Rr ￿ 1 where negative, the net marginal bene￿t function would
cease to be convex in the neighbourhood of the kink in Figure 1. A relative risk aversion
exceeding 1 at ^ x rules this possibility out. As we will show in the next section, stability
in a rational expectations equilibrium requires precisely that
p
b u0 + b Rr ￿ 1 > 0.
13Figure 2: Utility as a function of available supply.
Proposition 4 If Rr > 1, an FSD-deteriorating shift in the distribution of
available capacity will result in a higher ex ante demand. If Rr > 1 and
Pr > 2, any shift in the distribution of available capacity that reduces the
reliability at all levels will result in a higher ex-ante demand.
The e⁄ect of a perturbation of the capacity distribution function on the






(p ￿ e u
0)F￿(T)dT; (3.17)















where the second equality follows after integration by parts. Inspection of
either (3.17) or (3.18) shows that neither an FSD-deteriorating shift, nor
an SSD-deteriorating shift need result in a fall in expected utility. The





+ m ￿ pb xf1; T
Xeg,
will not be monotonically increasing (FSD-deteriorating shift) nor concave
(SSD-deteriorating shift) whenever ^ x > x￿. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
3.2 Comparative statics under rational expectations
Previously, we treated the anticipated aggregate demand as an exogenously
de￿ned variable. We now proceed by imposing rational expectations (RE), so
14that this anticipation is con￿rmed in equilibrium, viz., Xe = ^ x(p;Xe;F(￿)).12
This means that everywhere in the analysis, we can replace Xe by ^ x.
For expectations to be implicitly de￿ned by the model, we need @^ x
@Xej^ x=Xe 6=
1. In addition, for the RE equilibrium to be stable under eductive learning,
we need that ￿1 < @^ x
@Xej^ x=Xe < 1. Working out 1 ￿ @^ x
@Xe by means of (3.10)






b u0 + b Rr ￿ 1
￿





b u0 e Rr
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@Xej^ x=Xe > 0, the stability condition thus amounts to:
p
b u0 + b Rr ￿ 1 > 0; (3.20)
which we assume to hold from now on.
The equilibrium e⁄ects on demand from changes in output price or ca-
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￿ ^ x rF(^ x)
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1 ￿ b F
ih
p
b u0 + b Rr ￿ 1
i > 0: (3.22)
Note that the stability assumption ensures that the denominator is posi-
tive. Therefore, the same conditions that guarantee the expected sign at the
individual level, will do so in equilibrium.
12The simplicity with which the rational expectations equilibrium can be de￿ned in our
model is due to our assumption that consumers have identical preferences. If preferences


























(This is the Bayesian Nash equilibrium concept in a game with incomplete information
about types, but with common knowledge that types are drawn from the distribution ￿(￿)
on ￿.)
15We can now deduce the equilibrium e⁄ects of changes in price and supply












= ￿b x b rF
b Rr
p
b u0 + b Rr ￿ 1
: (3.23)
Since b x > x￿, the denominator will exceed b Rr. Thus the welfare e⁄ect of a
price increase is less detrimental in equilibrium than at the individual level.
This is because a price increase will reduce aggregate demand which in turn
reduces the likelihood of being rationed o⁄ and hence improves welfare (cf
(3.11)).












In the appendix, we show this can be written as
dV
d￿


















b u0 + b Rr ￿ 1
: (3.25)
Recall that at the individual level, a shift in the distribution function of either
an FSD or SSD type, could a⁄ect expected utility in both in a positive or
negative way. Equation (3.25) shows that any shift that reduces reliability at
all expectations levels will reduce expected consumer welfare under relative
risk aversion and with relative prudence larger than 1.
We have now all the ingredients for carrying out an analysis of the optimal
pricing and investment policy.
4 Welfare maximising pricing and investment
In this section, we study the optimal pricing policy, and the welfare e⁄ects
of changes in the capacity distribution. For this purpose, we de￿ne social
welfare as the sum of expected consumer surplus V and expected pro￿t,
while accounting for the fact that any loss that the public ￿rm makes has to
be ￿nanced through distortionary taxation on other economic activities (cf
La⁄ont and Tirole, 1993: 24) .





def = V + (1 + ￿)(E￿ ￿ K); (4.1)
where V is the consumer￿ s expected utility from (3.1) with x = Xe, E￿ is
the supplier￿ s expected operating surplus, and K denotes ￿xed costs. In the
appendix, we show that:
E￿ = (p ￿ c)rF(b x)b x; (4.2)
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(e rG ￿ e rH)dT
p
b u0 + b Rr ￿ 1
: (4.4)
An increase in ￿ (whether an FSD- or SSD-deterioration) has two opposite
e⁄ects on expected operating surplus. On the one hand, it reduces reliability,
while under the other hand it increases ex ante demand (under the conditions
mentioned in section 3.3). Expression (4.4) shows that when consumers are
su¢ ciently prudent, the net e⁄ect will be positive. The manager of the
utility has therefore little incentive to enhance reliability.
4.1 The optimal pricing rule
When consumers rationally expect a reliability rate below 100%, the ex ante
demand will satisfy (3.5) with Xe = ^ x. Using (3.23) and (4.3), the optimal
13Problem (4.1) reduces to pro￿t maximisation when ￿ ! 1. Alternatively, we could
formulate the problem as a utility maximisation problem, subject to the constraint that
the operating surplus (together with any exogenous subsidies) should cover the ￿xed costs.
Under this alternative, (1 + ￿) becomes the endogenous Lagrange multiplier to the break
even constraint E￿ ￿ K. Analytically, both approaches are equivalent.
17price policy then necessarily satis￿es the ￿rst-order condition:
dW
dp
jRE = ￿b x b rF
b Rr
p
b u0 + b Rr ￿ 1
+ (1 + ￿) b rF b x
c
b u0 + b Rr ￿ 1
p












which implicitly de￿nes the welfare maximising level of the ex ante order b x.
A necessary condition for a ￿nite price ^ p to maximise pro￿ts is that the
square bracket term be positive. This imposes an upper bound on the
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion given by 1+￿
￿ . If ￿ = 0:2 (0:3), then Rr
must not exceed 6 (41







[Pr (b x) ￿ 1]
￿
< 0; (4.7)
requiring that Pr (b x) < 1+2￿
￿ . If ￿ = 0:2 (0:3), then Pr must not exceed 7 (51
3).
With CRRA preferences, Pr ￿ Rr +1, and both upper bound conditions are
equivalent.
An important feature of (4.6) is that it is independent of the reliability
rate rF(b x), and thus of the supply distribution F(￿). Therefore, the optimal
ex ante order under uncertainty is identical to the optimal order under ade-
quate supply, x￿. If we denote the optimal price under supply adequacy by









Earlier, we concluded that for a given price, the consumer will place a
higher ex ante order when he expects inadequate supply, relative to when he
deems supply to be adequate. It follows that the optimal price under inade-
quate supply, b p, needs to exceed p￿ to choke o⁄ the ex ante demand, and to
equalise the demand in both cases. Intuitively, the absence of a market for
contingent claims and the use of a proportional rationing rule introduces a
negative externality among consumers. A single consumer neglects the fact
that when placing a higher order to hedge against an uncertain delivery, he
reduces the expected reliability rate of the system, thereby harming every-
body else. The optimal price di⁄erence b p￿p￿ thus acts as Pigouvian tax to
internalise this demand externality.
18Replacing in the consumer￿ s necessary condition (3.5) p by b p, b u0 by p￿,
and rearranging, we obtain the optimal mark-up of the price under supply
inadequacy relative to the optimal price under adequacy:
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Using a ￿rst order Taylor approximation of the square bracket term around
T = x￿, we may also write this as
























where s￿ def = F (x￿)E
￿
( T
x￿)2 j T ￿ x￿￿
+ [1 ￿ F(x￿)], i.e., the second moment
of the degree of supply reliability.
This mark-up rule has a straightforward operational content, linking the
size of the Pigouvian tax to the degrees of relative risk aversion and pru-
dence, and summary statistics of system reliability. Clearly, the mark-up is
































Intuitively, a strong degree of prudence underscores the consumer￿ s precau-
tionary motive when placing an order. This boosts the ex ante demand, and
thus has to be mitigated through a higher price.




















which is negative when P ￿
r > 2.
Proposition 5 The optimal ex-ante demand is independent of whether sup-
ply capacity is expected to be adequate or not. The optimal price when supply
is regarded inadequate must rise above the corresponding optimal price with
adequate supply in proportion to the degree of relative risk aversion, to the
extent consumers are prudent, and to the extent the system is unreliable.




r￿ . Hence, a perceived reliability of 75% requires a price exceeding the
base level by 33%.
14This is a ceteris paribus result as Pr and Rr are related through Pr ￿ Rr + 1 +
d log Rr(w)
d log w .
194.2 Welfare e⁄ect of a reliability improving investment
Let us now look at the welfare e⁄ects of an investment that leads to a re-
liability improving shift in the capacity distribution. We denote this shift
as d￿. This amounts to a reduction in the parameter ￿ so that d￿ = ￿d￿.
Since the optimal ex ante order is entirely governed by (4.6) and therefore
independent of the capacity distribution F(￿), any change in this distribution
will trigger a price e⁄ect to keep the ex ante order at x￿.
























Thus, if Pr ￿ 2, even under optimal pricing will a reliability improvement
have a negative impact on the expected operating surplus of the utility.






















and therefore positive if Pr ￿ 1.
The e⁄ect on social welfare is then found as (4.11)+(1 + ￿)(4.10)￿(1 +
￿)dK
d￿ , where dK
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The ￿rst term accounts for the welfare e⁄ects of a changes in risk exposure
due to d￿. The strength of this e⁄ect depends on the degree of relative risk
aversion. Its sign depends on the degree of relative prudence. A su¢ cient
condition for this welfare e⁄ect to be positive is that P ￿
r < 1+2￿
￿ (cf the SOC
(4.7)) and that P 0
r ￿ 0.
Proposition 6 If Pr(T) < 1+2￿
￿ (all T < x￿), the social welfare e⁄ects of an
FSD- or SSD-improving shift in the supply distribution are always positive
(when ignoring the investment cost).
Since the utility when concerned with maximising pro￿ts (or minimis-
ing losses) would never enact reliability improving investments, the above
proposition underscores to need for regulation of infrastructure choices.
We conclude by investigating the investment rule (4.12) under the as-
sumption of CRRA preferences. Then Rr and Pr are constant and related
20Figure 3: Density and reliability functions before (solid) and after (dashed)
an FDS improvement.
as Pr = Rr+1, and the square bracket term in (4.12) reduces to (1+￿)￿￿Rr.
This term will be positive i⁄Rr < 1+￿
￿ , which is exactly the earlier mentioned
necessary condition for an interior optimal pricing policy. Furthermore,
we can make use of the optimality condition (4.6) to rewrite this term as
(1 + ￿) c


















The appearance of the marginal cost on the bene￿t side is not surprising:
the optimal pricing rule tells us that the marginal cost exactly measures
the marginal willingness to pay, discounted for the social cost of the risk
premium.
In Figure 3, the bell shaped curves depict the supply density function be-
fore (solid) and after (dashed) an FSD improving shift.15 The monotonically
downward sloping lines are the corresponding reliability functions. Expres-
sion (4.13) suggests that we should compute the bene￿t of this shift as the







u0(x￿) > 1 because of risk aversion, (4.13) suggests the
15The density function f(T) corresponds to a transformed Beta distribution: f(T) =
1
￿Beta(T
￿ ;4;2), where ￿ = 1 (solid) and ￿ = 1:1 (dashed).











The objective of this paper has been to analyse questions of optimal pricing
and capacity choice for an interruptible public service, while recognizing the
interdependence of system reliability and consumer demand. Overall, the
analysis shows that perceptions of system reliability play a signi￿cant role in
the formation of consumer demand for a public service like electric power,
water, transport, gas, etc. Furthermore, the interdependence between system
reliability and demand must be taken into consideration when determining
the service price and capacity investment.
In particular we have shown that when consumers are proportionally ra-
tioned in case supply falls short of aggregate demand, supply uncertainty
typically leads to larger ex ante orders to hedge against the uncertainty.
This precautionary reaction is in the same spirit of a precautionary savings
increase due to increased uncertainty about the rate if return on savings. A
su¢ cient condition for it to come about is that consumers are su¢ ciently
risk averse and prudent.
In addition, we have shown that the welfare optimal price under supply
uncertainty is one that implements the same consumption level as under
certainty. This means the price must exceed the marginal willingness to pay
for the socially optimal level by a mark-up that counteracts the precautionary
motives for consuming more.
Finally, we have shown that even though a reliability improving invest-
ment will result in lower operating surplus, this drop will be outweighed by
an increase in consumer surplus.
Our results are derived within a stylised model that could be extended
in several dimensions. One is the introduction of more heterogeneity among
consumers, in particular by allowing for di⁄erences in preferences for the
good or service in question. We explained in footnote 12 how this should be
done. A second extension is the introduction of risk aversion with respect to
income. This would call for an extra instrument, to wit the use of monetary
compensation in case a consumer gets rationed. In several countries, the
regulatory authorities impose electricity suppliers to hand out compensations
in case of interruption. One may expect that the size of the compensation
22(per unit undelivered) relative to the price (per unit delivered) will hinge on
the di⁄erence in relative risk aversion with respect to consumption of the
particular good and the numØraire.
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6 Appendix
Properties of the reliability function





dF (T) + [1 ￿ F (X)]:











F (T)dT + [1 ￿ F (X)];
which gives (3.4a). (3.4b) follows straightforwardly by di⁄erentiating the
right-hand side of (3.4a) and rearranging. To prove (3.4c), start from ((3.4a)
and use the mean value theorem for integrals:
rF(X) = 1 ￿
1
X
F(Z)X = 1 ￿ F(Z), for some Z 2 [0;X]:
As X ! 0, Z ! 0 even faster.
Rewriting the ￿rst order condition using integration by parts
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Xe = 0. Then (3.2) can be written as
(3.5)
The second-order condition and comparative statics.











































26which we may re-express as:
































u0 [1 ￿ Pr + Rr]; (6.2)
(6.1) may be written as:
















































which is eq (3.7) in the text.
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which is expression (3.10) in the text.
The RE stability condition
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where use is made of the fact that R0
rx = Rr[1￿Pr+Rr] (cf (6.2)). Using the
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which is expression (3.19) in the text.
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which is expression (3.25) in the text.
The components of expected welfare and their derivatives
29The expected pro￿t for the supplier is:
E￿ = (p ￿ c)[(1 ￿ F(x))x + F(x)E(TjT < x)]
= (p ￿ c)x
￿





= (p ￿ c)rF(x)x; (6.3)
which is expression (4.2) in the text.
The derivatives of V and E￿ with respect to the price are as follows.
Vp = [b u
0^ xp ￿ ^ x ￿ p^ xp][1 ￿ F (^ x)] + c^ xpF (^ x) ￿ E [T j T < ^ x]F (^ x)
E￿p = r(^ x)^ x ￿ (p ￿ c)rF(^ x)^ xp + (p ￿ c)r
0
F(^ x)^ xp
= r(^ x)^ x ￿ [(p ￿ c)(1 ￿ F(^ x))] ^ xp
where use was made of (3.4b). With ^ xp given by (3.21), these lead to
expressions (3.23) and (4.3) in the text.
The second order condition for the optimal quantity
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which gives (4.7) in the text.
The approximation for the optimal mark-up rule
30The linear approximation of u0 (T)[Rr (T) ￿ 1] around T = x￿ is:
u
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where the second equality follows from integration by parts. Using the




















































Because u0￿ = p￿, this expression may be rearranged as (4.9) in the text.

























Using (3.9), (3.18), and the fact that @￿





this may be rewritten as
dW
d￿






































Rearranging, multiplying through by ￿1 to get the e⁄ect of d￿, and sub-
tracting (1 + ￿)dK
d￿ then produces (4.12) in the text.
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